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AN IDIOTIC ACT: ON THE NON-EXAMPLE OF ANTIGONE
Calum Neill
Antigone, Medea, Selma Jezkova, Mary Kay Letourneau, Andrea 
Yates… Žižek has over the years utilised a number of characters, both 
fictional and existent, and usually female, to illustrate various aspects of 
his Lacanian-derived conception of ethics. The contexts in which these 
characters are to be located and the actions they engage in determine 
them, for Žižek, as suitable ethical examples. This article will focus on one 
such example, perhaps the most obvious; Antigone. For Žižek, the crucial 
aspect of both Sophocles’ Antigone, the play, and Antigone, the character 
within the play, lies in what he, following Lacan,1 terms her ‘act’.2 The 
term ‘act’, in Lacanian theory, is differentiated from the sense of “mere 
behaviour”3 by the location and persistence of desire. This is to say that 
the act is necessarily a subjective undertaking and that it can be 
understood to be coterminous with the assumption of subjectivity and the 
responsibility entailed in such an assumption, the Freudian Wo Es war, soll 
Ich werden. Where behaviour would describe the response to needs, for 
example, the act is defined by the impetus of desire. Desire makes the 
subject act and as such the weight of responsibility for the act committed 
lies with the subject. Desire cannot be treated as a given which would 
determine the subject’s act without the subject’s volition. The very 
subjectivity which would be taken to act cannot be described without the 
manifestation of desire which would allow its constitution. But such desire 
must always be particular to the subject; it is the subject’s desire. The act 
would be the moment of subjective assumption in which the desire which 
                                                
1 J. Lacan. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Ed. J.A. Miller. Book VII. The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. Trans. D. Porter. London, Routledge, (1986) 1992. p. 282.
2 S. Žižek. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? London, Verso, 2001. pp. 165-178.
3 J. Lacan. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Ed. J.A. Miller. Book XI. The Four Fundamental 
Concepts of Psychoanalysis. Trans. A. Sheridan. London, Penguin, (1973) 1977. p. 50.
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is in one is manifest and thus brought into existence. The act in this sense 
should be understood to be coterminous with the emergence of desire; the 
act is desire made manifest. It is in this sense that the Lacanian act is 
always, necessarily, idiotic, in the etymological sense, wherein idios would 
designate ‘one’s own’.
Lacan insists immediately after his commentary on Antigone that 
the act necessarily partakes of a double instance of judgement. The subject, 
in acting, must make the judgement to act and the judgement of the act. 
Or, phrased otherwise, there is in the act both the judgement to act and the 
judgement to act in this particular way. As no rule exists to define how or 
when one must act, the weight of both moments of judgement must lie 
solely with the subject. That is, in acting, and in the moments of 
judgement indispensable to the concept of the act, the subject necessarily 
assumes the weight of responsibility for the choice to act. The act is then 
also contemporary with the possibility of the ethical.
For Žižek, Antigone’s act at the beginning of the play is such a 
moment of an act in the full and properly Lacanian sense of the term. If 
‘the great unwritten, unshakeable traditions’4 invoked by Antigone can be 
situated as indicative of her desire, then her act would be understood to be 
the manifestation and subjective assumption of this desire. There is in the 
act, says Lacan, always ‘an element of structure, by the fact of concerning a real 
that is not self-evidently caught up in it’.5 This would appear to correspond to 
the structure we encounter in Antigone. The laws of the gods ‘speak’ from 
beyond, that is, on the side of the Real. Which is, of course, to say they do 
not in fact speak at all. They are manifest in Antigone and given 
expression through her act in such a way that ‘it isn’t a question of 
recognising something which would be entirely given, ready to be coapted’.6 In 
                                                
4 Sophocles. The Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus The King, Oedipus At Colonus. Trans. 
R. Fagles. London, Penguin, 1984. p. 82, line 505.
5 J. Lacan. op.cit. 1977. p. 50.
6 J. Lacan. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Ed. J.A. Miller. Book II. The Ego in Freud’s Theory 
and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, 1954-55. Trans. S. Tomaselli., New York, Norton, 
(1978) 1988. p. 229.
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giving voice to the law of the gods, Antigone should be understood to 
have created and brought forth ‘a new presence in the world’.7 She should, 
that is, be understood to have named her desire and, moreover, assumed 
herself as the cause of this desire.
For Žižek, Antigone functions as the ethical example par excellence
insofar as she is understood to ‘exemplify the unconditional fidelity to the 
Otherness of the Thing that disrupts the entire social edifice’.8 Capitalising the 
‘O’ of ‘Other’ in the ‘Otherness of the Thing’, Žižek can be understood to be 
emphasising the Thing, das Ding, as it relates to the field of the Symbolic. 
That is to say, das Ding as it would represent the limits of the Symbolic 
field, das Ding as indicative of the insistence of the lack in the Other as it is 
experienced by the subject. It is, as such, that das Ding would be 
understood as (a name for) that which would disrupt ‘the entire social 
edifice’.9
The act, for Žižek, describes the moment of suspension of the 
Symbolic, the recognition of the limits of the Symbolic. In such a moment 
of recognition it is not that the Other would somehow be suspended to be 
subsequently resolved as a moment of a dialectic or integrated into a 
subsequent schemata. The act, for Žižek, is not a moment of Aufhebung. 
Rather, in the Žižekian act, one would assume the very location of the lack 
which persists in the Other:
it is not so much that, in the act, I ‘sublate’/‘integrate’ the Other; 
it is rather that, in the act, I directly ‘am’ the Other-Thing.10
For Žižek, the ethical import of the act, (and the act is for Žižek the 
very definition of the ethical moment), is separated from any notion of 
responsibility for or towards the other.  His is not an ethics of 
responsibility but, rather, his understanding of ethics is as the momentary 
                                                
7 ibid.
8 S. Žižek. op.cit. 2001. p. 157.
9 ibid.
10 ibid, p. 160.
The Letter, Issue 34 (Autumn 2005) pp. 1-28
and, in the moment, absolute suspension of the Symbolic order. The 
ethical act, for Žižek, is neither a response to the other nor a response to 
the Other. 
The (ethical) act proper is precisely neither a response to the 
compassionate plea of my neighbourly semblant (the stuff of 
sentimental humanism), nor a response to the unfathomable 
Other’s call.11
Žižek contrasts this notion of the ‘ethical act’ as assumption of the 
lack in the Other, as the assumption of the location of das Ding, with the 
Derridean notion of ethics as decision. A notion described by Critchley as 
follows:
the political decision is made ex nihilo, and is not deduced or read 
off from a pre-given conception of justice or the moral law, as in 
Habermas, say, and yet it is not arbitrary. It is the demand 
provoked by the other’s decision in me that calls forth political 
invention, that provokes me into inventing a norm and taking a 
decision. The singularity of the context in which the demand arises 
provokes an act of invention whose criterion is universal.12
Žižek perceives in this passage, and by extension, in the Derridean 
original, ‘two levels of the decision’.13 It is with this bifurcation of the 
decision that Žižek takes issue. The decision, understood as the act, 
would, for Žižek, have to be such that the two moments of decision he 
perceives in Derrida’s and Critchley’s accounts would coincide. Here, 
Antigone is offered as the paramount example.
                                                
11 ibid, p. 161.
12 S. Critchley ‘The Other’s Decision in Me (What Are the Politics of Friendship?)’ in S. 
Critchley Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity. London, Verso, (1997) 1999. p. 277.
13 S. Žižek. op.cit. p.162.
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Is it not, rather, that her decision (to insist unconditionally on a 
proper funeral for her brother) is precisely an absolute decision in 
which the two dimensions of decision overlap?14
Žižek’s point here is that separating the decision into two moments, 
into, that is, the ‘decision to decide’15 and ‘a concrete actual intervention’,16
is to render the decision or the act as non-absolute. That is, it is to render 
the act as less than an act. The act, for Žižek, as we have seen, is situated in 
the moment of suspension of the Other, what he terms directly ‘being’ the
‘Other-Thing’,17 the assumption by the subject of the irrecuperable rent in 
the social edifice. To incorporate as a necessary aspect of the act its 
reinscription in the Symbolic is, for Žižek, to miss the radicality of the act.
The question which insists here is that, in divorcing the act from 
any reinscription in the symbolic, is not one necessarily, from a Lacanian 
perspective at least, rendering the act as the impossibility of the ethical? 
That is to say, Žižek’s deployment of the ‘act’ appears closer to what Lacan 
designates as passage à l’acte, an action in which one takes flight from the 
Other, an action which would properly entail the, albeit momentary, 
dissolution of the subject and consequent impossibility of the ethical.  
Phrased otherwise, the act so divorced from its reinscription is not party to 
a judgement which, in Lacan’s understanding, would define the ethical; 
an ethics essentially consists in a judgement of our actions, with 
the proviso that it is only significant if the action implied by it also 
contains within it, or is supposed to contain, a judgement, even if it 
is only implicit. The presence of judgement in both sides is essential 
to the structure.18




17 ibid, p. 163.
18 J. Lacan. The Seminar of Jacques Lacan. Ed. J.A. Miller. Book VII. The Ethics of 
Psychoanalysis 1959-1960. Trans. D. Porter. 1992. London, Routledge, 1986, p. 311.
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Lacan’s insistence upon there being two moments of judgement 
essential to the ethical effectively separates ethics, on the one hand, from 
mere behaviour and, on the other, from mere occurrence. What happens, 
in order to be understood to have happened to a subject and to be 
understood to have been caused to have happened by a subject must 
entail a minimum inscription in the Symbolic order, an inscription, that is, 
on the level of meaning. In order for an act to partake of the responsibility 
which would render it ethical, this moment of inscription in meaning must 
be retroactively read into and assumed in the very decision to act. For 
Lacan, in his invocation of Freud’s Wo Es war, soll Ich werden, it is in the 
moment of the assumption of subjectivity that the subject retroactively 
reads its responsibility into its actions. The subject, in assuming itself, 
assumes responsibility for the act of its own emergence. It is important to 
acknowledge here the two moments of judgement on which Lacan insists 
as definitional of ethics cannot be reduced to a strict chronology. The two 
instances of judgement are, rather, indicative of two levels. The judgement 
to act, that it is necessary or desirable to act, necessarily entails the 
judgement that acting in this way is preferable to acting in another way; for 
example, by doing nothing. In so judging, the subject is by necessity 
creating a new norm, regardless of how contingent or particular such a 
norm may be. In judging, then, the subject must both inscribe its 
judgement, its choice, in the Symbolic and assume utterly the weight of 
this judgement or choice. That is to say, the act, insofar as it is to be 
considered ethical, necessarily entails the assumption of responsibility in 
the field of the Other.
In this sense, Derrida’s notion of ‘the other’s decision in me’ is actually 
closer to Lacan’s act than Žižek would have us believe.19 In Derrida’s 
discussion of the decision in Politics of Friendship, the emphasis is on the 
incommensurability of the decision to any traditional notion of subjective 
agency and the related notion of responsibility. Derrida’s point is that a 
                                                
19 Y. Stavrakakis. ‘The Lure of Antigone: Aporias of An Ethics of the Political’, Umbr(a) 2003; 
Ignorance of the Law. New York, SUNY Centre for the Study of Psychoanalysis and 
Culture, 2003. pp. 117-130.
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decision, in the classical sense of dêcaedêre, a cut, a break, and thus an 
absolute decision as opposed to a mere calculation which would unfurl on 
the basis of a prescription, is still necessarily understood in a context. This 
is precisely not to say that the decision is reducible to its context, which 
would be to rejoin to the logic of a calculation. The decision must, rather, 
be seen as breaking from the context which would precede it and be 
reinscribed in a context which would then be distinct from that which 
preceded it. It is the moment of responsibility here which would render 
the decision ethical and distinct from a mere occurrence or behaviour. It is 
the reinscription of the decision in the realm of comprehension which 
allows the subject to assume responsibility.
In contrast to a traditional notion of subjective agency, a subjectivity 
which, in Derrida’s understanding, would be closed in on itself and thus 
incapable of responsibility, ‘a subject to whom nothing can happen, not even 
the singular event for which he believes to have taken and kept the initiative’,20
Derrida posits the notion of the decision as signifying ‘in me the other who 
decides and rends’.21
The passive decision, condition of the event, is always in me, 
structurally, another event, a rending decision as the decision of the 
other. Of the absolute other in me, the other as the absolute that 
decides on me in me. Absolutely singular in principle, according to 
its most traditional concept, the decision is not only always 
exceptional, it makes an exception for/of me. In me. I decide, I make 
up my mind in all sovereignty - this would mean: the other than 
myself, the me as other and other than myself, he makes or I make 
an exception of the same. This normal exception, the supposed 
norm of all decision, exonerates from no responsibility. Responsible 
for myself before the other, I am first of all and also responsible for 
the other before the other.22
                                                
20 J. Derrida. The Politics of Friendship. Trans. G. Collins. London, Verso, (1994) 1997. p. 68.
21 ibid.
22 ibid, pp. 68-9.
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We might understand Derrida here as indicating that there is that in 
the subject which is irrecuperable to any sense of self-identity, that which 
would escape the ‘monadology’ of the ego; the subject, that is, as 
inadequate to itself. The decision reduced to a moment of self-sufficiency 
of the subject would not be a decision in the traditional sense at all but 
would rather be contained as a moment of calculation, inextricable from 
the ‘calculable permanence (which would) make every decision an accident which 
leaves the subject unchanged and indifferent’.23 It is in contrast to this that the 
notion of the other’s decision in me figures as the impossibility of self-
identity, the rupture in the subject which can neither be contained nor 
recuperated. It is precisely from such a notion that Derrida adduces the 
possibility of responsibility. 
Responsibility cannot remain responsibility when it is immersed in 
the pre-given. If subjectivity is closed upon itself, then responsibility 
cannot lie with the subject. The weight of the occurrence would rather 
remain with that system or field of understanding of which the calculation 
would be a moment. It is in response to the other, to ‘the other in me’ that 
responsibility becomes a possibility precisely because such a response 
cannot be contained within a pre-given system of knowledge.
To give in the name of, to give to the name of, the other is what 
frees responsibility from knowledge - that is, what brings 
responsibility unto itself, if there ever is such a thing.24
This is not, for Derrida, to separate responsibility in any absolute 
sense from knowledge, it is not to say that responsibility has nothing to do 
with knowledge. It is rather to point to the fact that, in the decision, as an 
ethical possibility, responsibility is impossible if the decision is reduced 
without remainder to knowledge.
                                                
23 ibid, p. 68.
24 ibid, p. 69.
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…one must certainly know, one must know it, knowledge is 
necessary if one is to assume responsibility, but the decisive or 
deciding moment of responsibility supposes a leap by which an act 
takes off, ceasing in that instant to follow the consequence of what 
is - that is, of that which can be determined by science or 
consciousness - and thereby frees itself (this is what is called 
freedom), by the act of its act, of what is therefore heterogeneous to 
it, that is, knowledge.
In sum, a decision is unconscious.25
Knowledge, for Derrida, is an indispensable prerequisite for the 
decision and, subsequently, for the assumption of responsibility but the 
decision cannot itself be reduced to knowledge without this rendering it 
‘less’ than decisive, rendering it, that is, in the realm of pure calculation. 
On the other hand, without knowledge, there remains no possibility of 
responsibility insofar as responsibility would entail a context, a conception 
of that for and towards which one would be responsible and how. 
Responsibility thus figures and can only arise between the closed 
automaticity of the system of knowledge and the ‘meaninglessness’ that 
would be beyond any systematisation. Without exceeding knowledge, the 
decision is but a part of knowledge and thus not of the subject. Without 
returning to knowledge, the decision has no sense; it is purely arbitrary.
Is not this notion of the decision commensurate with the notion of 
the ethical in Lacan, with the notion of the ethical act as that which can 
appeal to no guarantor in the Other, as that which by definition takes 
place at the limits of the Symbolic order, as that which cannot be reduced 
to the law and yet, at the same time, must be inscribed in the Symbolic 
order? Is this not commensurate with the notion of the ethical as a 
pulsational moment which emerges from but must also assume a place in 
the Symbolic? 
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Contra Žižek’s notion of the act which must be located absolutely 
beyond the Symbolic order, both Derrida’s ‘decision’ and Lacan’s ‘act’ are 
such that, in order to be understood as ethical, they must entail a moment 
of (re)inscription in the order of the comprehensible, or, for Derrida, 
knowledge, and for Lacan, the Symbolic. That is to say, in insisting on the 
exclusivity of what he terms identification with the ‘Other-Thing’ as the 
defining moment of the act, Žižek might be understood to precisely 
occlude the ethical potential from the act. Returning to Antigone, if, in 
Žižek’s terms, her act is possible because of ‘the direct identification of her 
particular/determinate decision with the Other’s (Thing’s) injunction/call’, 26
then it is difficult to see in what sense such an act might be considered 
ethical.
It is, however, for Žižek, precisely this exclusivity, the radical 
suspension of the Other without recourse to a further moment of 
reinscription which does render the act ethical. Antigone figures here, as 
we have noted, as the paramount example of the act as a moment of 
absolute suspension. Antigone, for Žižek, ‘does not merely relate to the 
Other-Thing, she - for a brief, passing moment of, precisely, decision - directly is 
the Thing, thus excluding herself from the community regulated by the 
intermediate agency of symbolic regulations’.27 It is in so excluding herself 
from the community, in situating herself beyond the regulations of the 
Symbolic order, that Antigone can be understood, for Žižek, to have 
engaged in a proper act, precisely because the act, for Žižek, is not simply 
‘beyond the reality principle’ in the sense that it would be the engagement of 
a performative reconfiguration of reality, of, that is, the Symbolic. Rather, 
the act is that which would ‘change the very co-ordinates of the “reality 
principle’’’. This is not to suggest that for Žižek the act entails performing 
the impossible. Žižek’s point concerns the very structuration of what 
would be considered (im)possible in the first place. The radical character 
of the act lies in the fact that it would be that which alters the very 
contours of what would be considered possible. Or in moral terms, it 
                                                
26 S. Žižek. Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism? London, Verso, 2001. p. 163.
27 ibid.
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would not be that which would challenge the received notion of the good 
but rather it would be that which would redefine what might be 
considered as good.28
In this context Žižek conceives of Antigone as an example of 
(ethical) civil disobedience. This is not to resort to a reading of Antigone as 
the story of a conflict between two notions of justice or two instances of 
the law. In Žižek’s reading there is the law on the one hand, the socio-
political world of Creon’s city, and there is the suspension of this law or 
‘reality’ on the other. That is to say, Žižek recognises Lacan’s point that the 
‘unwritten, unshakeable traditions’ 29  invoked by Antigone should not be 
understood to constitute an alternative conception of justice or competing 
sense of law so much as that which would insist in her beyond the law. 
Antigone, in Žižek’s reading does not ‘decide to disobey the positive law out of 
respect for a more fundamental law’,30 rather she ‘defies the predominant notion 
of the Good’.31
Žižek explains this point in terms of the Platonic distinction 
between truth and doxa. Where for Plato, we might understand that doxa is 
insubstantial opinion, while the truth is universal, eternal and immutable, 
in Žižek’s understanding, our conception of this distinction might be seen 
to have been reversed. That is, doxa would reflect how things ‘really are’32
in the sense that we would derive our notion of the Good or even our 
understanding of the world and the manner in which ‘it works’ from 
consensus, tradition or even opinion polls. Opposed to this, it would be 
the act which would intervene as the purely subjective and unique ‘truth’. 
A ‘truth’ which is clearly, then, not ‘true’ in the Platonic sense of 
corresponding to some perpetual higher order but is rather ‘true’ in the 
sense of the moment of a pure creation which would ‘expose’ the 
                                                
28 ibid, p. 167.
29 Sophocles, The Three Theban Plays: Antigone, Oedipus The King, Oedipus at Colonus. Trans. 
R. Fagles. London, Penguin,  1984. p. 82, line 505.
30 S. Žižek. op.cit. 2001. p.167.
31 ibid, p. 168.
32 ibid.
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conventions of knowledge to be inadequate and force their 
reconfiguration. For Žižek, the act would be such a truth insofar as the act 
would be that which would resist and refuse recuperation to the pre-
existent symbolic matrix. Where something like a speech act would, by 
definition, rely ‘for its performative power on the pre-established set of symbolic 
rules and/or norms’,33 the Žižekian act would signal a break with any pre-
established or given order.
This, for Žižek, would be ‘the whole point of Lacan’s reading of 
Antigone’.34 In his reading, Žižek emphasises Antigone’s willingness to 
risk her ‘entire social existence’,35 her defiance of the ‘social-symbolic power of 
the City embodied in the ruler (Creon)’.36 Through so doing, Antigone could 
be understood to have entered the realm of ‘symbolic death’,37 that is to say, 
she can be understood to have situated herself outside the symbolic space 
of what was, previously, her society. For Žižek, such a moment of self-
expulsion is tantamount to a ‘suspension of the big Other’,38 a radical break 
with and from the Symbolic order. 
In order to emphasise and clarify this radical character of the act, 
the fact that the act should be radically divorced from the Symbolic, that it 
should be envisaged as irrecuperable to the Symbolic, Žižek contrasts it 
with what he terms the performative ‘staging’ of revolt, or ‘performative 
reconfiguration’ 39  of the Symbolic order. Such performative 
reconfiguration would be exemplified in the position taken by Judith 
Butler in The Psychic Life of Power where she discusses the possibilities of 
subjective ‘resistance to given forms of social reality’.40 In The Ticklish Subject
Žižek responds to Butler’s advocation of forms of resistance which would 
                                                







39 ibid, p. 264.
40 J. Butler. The Psychic Power of Life. Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1997. p. 97.
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successfully reconfigure and thus, contingently at least, offer the potential 
of ameliorating one’s social condition(s), warning against the illusion of 
assuming to have successfully challenged from within that which is 
always already in a position to recuperate any such challenge. The 
distinction here, for Žižek, is that between a reconfiguration which would 
maintain the terms of the Symbolic and a reconfiguration which would 
transform the very contours of the Symbolic and thus the terms in which 
the reconfiguration might be understood.41
Žižek’s point can perhaps be illustrated in the common-place 
notion of reverse discrimination where the very points of discrimination 
are precisely upheld in the process of their supposedly politically correct 
reversal. Some negative aspects of discrimination against ‘the disabled’, 
for example, may be addressed through the implementation of quotas for 
the employment of a certain percentage of ‘disabled’ workers but such 
regulation cannot but uphold the demarcation of certain people as 
‘disabled’ and potentially stigmatised and maintain the significance of 
factors otherwise deemed ‘irrelevant’ to the criteria of employment or 
ability to ‘do the job’.
A position like Butler’s entails, for Žižek, both an overestimation of 
the effectivity of ‘performative reconfiguration’ and an underestimation of 
the potential for the more thoroughgoing revolt which would be 
exemplified in the character and act of Antigone. For Žižek, it seems, it is 
this thoroughgoing rupturing status of the act with regard to the 
Symbolic, the impossibility of situating the act in or recuperating the act to 
the Symbolic which renders it ethical.
What, however, are we to make of Žižek’s insistence on the act as 
irrecuperable to the Symbolic? In the distinction that he puts forward 
between performative reconfiguration and absolute reconfiguration, one 
might be justified in asking how the latter might be possible. Clearly here 
Žižek is not suggesting that everything of the Symbolic is razed. He is not 
suggesting, for example, that the Greek spoken in Thebes would cease to 
                                                
41 S. Žižek. op.cit, 1999. p. 264.
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be spoken after Antigone’s act. He appears, rather, to be suggesting that 
the meaning of the symbolic or social edifice is unavoidably altered. 
Emphasising the moral aspect, as Žižek does, this would mean, for 
example, not that the term ‘good’ could no longer be applied but rather 
that what precisely would be understood by the term ‘good’, if ‘good’ is 
ever in fact understood precisely, would have been altered. That is, the 
contours of the Symbolic would have changed such that the relations 
between terms within the Symbolic would have been altered. But is this 
the same as saying that the Symbolic would have undergone a thorough 
revision? Or, to phrase the question slightly differently, how might one 
judge whether the change in the Symbolic has been thorough enough to 
count in Žižek’s schema as thorough? This brings us to a significant point 
concerning the Symbolic which Žižek appears to glide over. 
The Symbolic order is necessarily experienced by the subject as 
Other, as an Other of which there is available no objective and totalising 
conception. That is to say, the Symbolic as Other figures only insofar as it 
figures in relation to the subject who would encounter it. The Symbolic 
order is a structural condition which, as it manifests for and in relation to 
the subject, can only be seen to exist insofar as it exists for that subject. 
Conjoined with this, the Symbolic would be the field in which the subject 
would assume its constitution and, thus, from which it would 
retroactively posit its emergence. While, then, the Symbolic and the 
subject obviously cannot be reduced to (aspects of) one another, neither 
can they, in this context, be separated from one another.
The conception of the act as a reconfiguration of the Symbolic 
would then have to figure as a subjective undertaking. In terms of 
Antigone’s act, the act would not only be Antigone’s in the sense that she 
performs it but it would be hers in the sense that it is performed in relation 
to the Symbolic order as it manifests for her. This would be to 
acknowledge that the act can only be experienced by the subject. But even 
in order for the subject to be understood to have experienced the act or to 
have experienced itself as acting this would necessitate the act’s 
(re)inscription in the Symbolic. The act, as coterminous with the 
The Letter, Issue 34 (Autumn 2005) pp. 1-28
assumption of subjectivity, is necessarily pulsational. One cannot 
(permanently) occupy the act.
We should perhaps remember here Lacan’s claim from Television
that ‘Suicide is the only act which can succeed without misfiring’.42 Suicide 
would be such an act precisely because it is not, from the subjective 
perspective, reinscribed in the Symbolic. There is in suicide no 
continuation, no possibility of recuperation by or to the Symbolic but also, 
quite clearly, no possibility of subjectivity either. That suicide is the only 
act which can succeed without misfiring is not to advocate suicide, it is, 
rather, to recognise the impossibility of other acts not misfiring. Suicide is 
the only act which would not entail a recuperation to the Symbolic by the 
subject who would have committed it.
The point remains here, however, even acknowledging this 
subjective relation to the Other, that any act at all, in Žižek’s 
understanding of it, might figure as ethical even if this means that it only 
figures as ethical for the particular subject who has acted. Which is 
precisely to say that there is available no means to differentiate the ethical 
from the unethical. To paraphrase Simon Critchley’s question concerning 
Badiou’s notion of the event, and there does appear to be some theoretical 
resemblance between Žižek’s ‘act’ and Badiou’s ‘event’, how and in virtue of 
what is one to distinguish an ethical act from a non-ethical act?43  Critchley 
continues his critique of Badiou by imagining what he characterises as ‘the 
pragmatist inference’.44 Again, to borrow Critchley’s point, the pragmatist 
might agree that there is no possibility of distinguishing between the 
ethical and non-ethical act, thus introducing a form of moral relativism. 
Situating the act in exclusive relation to the symbolic cannot but, then, 
render the ethics which might otherwise pertain to the act as purely 
arbitrary. 
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Invoking Kant, Žižek represents the ‘proper ethical act’ as ‘doubly 
formal: not only does it obey the universal form of law, but this universal form is 
also its sole motive’. 45  Moreover, the proper ethical act is inherently 
transgressive. It is not merely a matter of allegiance to a universal duty 
without pathological motives but it is an allegiance to a form of action 
which will redefine the very form of the prior conception of what would 
constitute the good, the norm, the Symbolic order. Žižek’s ‘moral law does 
not follow the Good - it generates a new shape of what counts as ‘Good’’.46 The 
proper ethical act is then, for Žižek, not so much defined by its irrational 
nature but is that which would institute a new conception or criteria for 
what counts as rational at all. Nothing which precedes an act is adequate 
to the task of judging the act.
What Žižek’s description of the act omits is the crucial point that 
even that which would ‘appear’ to conform to the existent law might be an 
act. The act does not need to be ‘transgressive’ in the sense in which Žižek 
applies the term, which is to say that, because the existent norms are or the 
existent system is always already without adequate foundation, the act is 
always already, by definition, excessive with regard to the law. That is to 
say, the existent system cannot somehow be bracketed off such that only 
that which would appear to be transgressive of the system, providing that 
it is also enacted without pathological motives, is admissible as an ethical 
act. No system can adequately, in itself, account for its own ground 
(arche). At the same time, any system which appeals outside itself for its 
grounds simply shifts the problem to another level wherein the external 
source of authorisation would, in turn, require grounding. It is such a 
reductio ad infinitum that allows the possibility of ethics as that which is 
not contained within or reducible to the law or system. That is, in order 
to avoid reducing the ethical moment to a facet of the system, it must be 
conceived as the subjective response in the face of the system. This does 
not then mean, however, that the space of ethics is contra the law or 
system in the base sense of being against the letter of the law, in which 
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case it would necessarily be determined by the law or system. It is rather 
that the ethical, in being that which the law cannot contain, is beyond or 
outwith the law or system. That is to say, to avoid the position of 
automaton, to avoid slavish adherence to the law, it would be necessary 
for the subject to judge in each situation. Through such judgement the 
subject would assume the locus of justification for its action or stance. 
Such a logic is necessarily the case whether the resultant judgement 
proves to be, in effect, in accordance with or contra existent practices or 
norms. In this sense, not only can the ethical not be reduced to the law, but 
neither can it be reduced to an aberration of the law.
As Žižek himself makes clear, the act is radically distinguished 
from ‘a simple criminal violation’.47 This, not because the act is necessarily a 
violation without pathological intent or because the act is a violation in the 
name of a competing conception of right or justice but precisely because 
the act entails the assumption of cause by the subject without illusory 
appeal to some other (or Other) foundation for action. It is in this sense 
that the act would be properly described as a suspension of the Other. The 
act is located at the limits of the authority of the Other, the act is the point 
of subjective intervention without appeal to anOther authority.
This is a point that can perhaps be deduced from Žižek’s comments on the 
impossibility of coincidence between one’s particular act or insistence, the 
fidelity to this or that cause, and the insistence of das Ding. This point in 
Žižek is somewhat obfuscated by his insistence on conflating the Other 
with the Thing. It is perhaps possible, however, to clarify this point by 
allowing these two terms the specificity with which Lacan applies them. 
The Other, as we have seen, can be understood as coterminous with the 
Symbolic order insofar as it manifests as a subjective experience. The 
Other, that is, is the Symbolic order as it is, and with the specificity with 
which it is, encountered by the subject. Das Ding is that which cannot be 
recuperated to either the Symbolic order or to the Imaginary order. It is 
that of the Real which would insist at the limits of subjective experience. It 
is, in the context of ‘intersubjectivity’, that of the other which cannot be 
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accommodated to a point of recognition, that in the other which can 
neither form an aspect of identity nor be reduced to a point of 
signification. It is also, then, that in and of the subject which can neither be 
reduced to imaginary identification nor recuperated to a system of 
signification. What Žižek characterises as the insistence of ‘the Other-
Thing’48 would be more accurately described as that in any encounter 
which cannot be recuperated to a totalising comprehension. It is the 
insistence of this Thing which cannot adequately be accommodated 
which would be indicative of the lack in both the other and the Other.
In the encounter with the Other, the Other is experienced as demanding 
of the subject. It is such a demand which would be indicative of das 
Ding, insofar as das Ding might be that which would satisfy this 
demand. In this sense, das Ding can be understood to be a name for that 
which the Other is experienced as lacking.
It is clear then that, as Žižek appears to acknowledge, there is no 
possible correlation between the (particular) insistence of the subject and 
das Ding. If there were, then this would be to simultaneously ‘solve’ the 
lack in the Other and the lack in the subject. Which would be to say that 
there is no subject and no Other for the subject. There would be, that is, no 
Symbolic order in which the act could be (re)inscribed.
The act should rather be understood as the subject’s always 
inadequate response to the Other (and the other). The act is the moment of 
production of something in response to the other and the Other, precisely 
in the sense that that something is not the Thing, is not adequate to das 
Ding. The act would be the moment of subjective assumption, the moment 
of the subject’s causing its desire to come forth. But such desire is never 
something which would be ‘entirely given’,49 it is something which must be 
brought into the world anew. Insofar as the subject’s act is to be 
understood, it must be reinscribed in the Symbolic and, in being so 
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inscribed, it does necessarily alter the Symbolic. It is in this sense that, as 
Žižek correctly notes, the act is a creatio ex nihilo. It is in the act that ‘the 
subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world’.50 It must however by 
emphasised that it, the act, is commensurate with the moment of 
subjective assumption. That is, that the act is the act for the subject who 
would have constituted itself in the act. Or, phrased otherwise, the act is 
the subjective moment of assumption and is thus only experienced as such 
by the subject. This is not to argue that Antigone is a non-ethical example. 
It is rather to emphasise that the very concept of an ethical example is non-
sensical. The ethical consists in the moment of assumption of and as the 
cause of one’s existence as subject. It is availed of no exterior support or
justification. 
It is precisely for this reason that Antigone’s act does not constitute 
the exemplary instance of the ethical act. Antigone, that is, cannot, and does 
not in Lacan’s reading, function as an ethical example. 
Lacan’s reading of Antigone is not, then, concerned with the ethical 
status of her choice or her act. Lacan is rather concerned with Antigone as 
artefact, as a dramatic work and with the work’s relation to the spectator. 
Within the context of the play, Antigone, the character, functions as a 
spectacle. It is her splendour, not her act which has ethical significance. 
This, not because her splendour is in itself ethical, but rather because the 
spectacle of Antigone forces (a potentially ethical) reaction from the 
audience.
One manner in which we might begin to appreciate Lacan’s 
discussion of Antigone is in the relation between the Imaginary, Symbolic 
and Real. What one might term the conventional reading of Antigone, a 
reading which would interpret the play as staging the confrontation 
between two competing conceptions of justice, such as that presented by 
Hegel in The Phenomenology of Mind, is what we might characterise as a 
reading which prioritises the Symbolic. Žižek’s reading, which 
acknowledges the Lacanian point that the ‘unshakeable traditions’ might 
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not refer to another conception of justice, is no less such a Symbolic 
reading. In his interpretation, the act is defined exclusively in relation to 
the Symbolic and, thus, Antigone’s revolt is, for Žižek, a revolt against the 
Symbolic. The central significance of Antigone, the play, for Lacan, 
however, lies in the repeated motif of the limit. The limit here cannot be 
reduced to the simple limit ‘between’ the Symbolic and the Real. It is also 
the limit of the Imaginary, a particular instance of limit on which Lacan, in 
his reading, places considerable emphasis. This is not to suggest that 
Lacan’s reading rebounds to another extreme. The point is rather that the 
three realms can never be fully disentangled (except, that is, in the case of 
psychosis). 
For Lacan, the significance of Antigone lies precisely in its ability to 
convey the limit point which would mark the intersection of the realms of 
the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. It is crucial to acknowledge here 
that this limit point does entail but cannot be reduced to the limit of the 
Symbolic. To so reduce the limit point to the gap where the Symbolic 
opens onto the Real, to, that is, occlude the Imaginary, results in those 
notions of the play as a contest or opposition between different 
approaches to the law or convention, whether this be in the sense of two 
competing conceptions of justice (Hegel) or between two competing 
approaches to the law, that is to say, between fidelity to and transgression 
of the law (Žižek). While such approaches are not without significant 
insights, it is only in reinstating the imaginary dimension that we can 
really begin to appreciate the ethical, as opposed to moral-juridical, 
significance of the play. Those readings which would emphasise 
exclusively the rent in the Symbolic cannot but render the play a discourse 
on law to the exclusion of the ethical. As such, the so-called ethical 
example of Antigone cannot but falter. Where there is no ethics, where 
ethics is foreclosed, there can be no example of the ethical. It is only in 
reintroducing the imaginary dimension that the ethical import of the play 
can be brought to light. It will, however, be brought to light in a manner 
which directly occludes the possibility of commandeering it as an 
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example. That is to say, through Lacan’s reading of Antigone we can begin 
to appreciate that the ethical avails itself of no examples.
For Lacan the figure of the other necessarily entails the correlation 
of the Symbolic, the Imaginary and the Real. The encounter with the other, 
that is, can be reduced to neither the dimension of the Symbolic nor the 
Imaginary but rather, insofar as it entails both, it indicates the limit point 
where they would open onto the Real. That is to say, there is imaginary 
identification and there is symbolic comprehension, there is an overlap 
wherein imaginary identification would partake of a minimum of 
symbolic ordering and, beyond this, something insists which would refuse 
any such recuperation. This would be the limit point of das Ding and, for 
Lacan, ‘[i]t is around this image of the limit that the whole play turns’.51 The 
image of the limit is dispersed so thoroughly through the play that it, 
quite literally, cannot be contained. It cannot, that is, be recuperated to a 
straightforward symbolisation. The play, in this sense, demonstrates the 
insistence of the limit without itself becoming a self-contained discourse 
on the limit. 
That the figure of Antigone might be held up as the focal point here 
is not to say that the limit is, exclusively, Antigone’s. The motif and 
functioning of the limit is evident too in the other characters, the action 
and setting of the play. The notion of the limit central to the play is, as 
Lacan stresses, articulated ‘throughout the text of Antigone, in the mouths of 
all of the characters and of Tiresias’, 52  the seer or prophet who can be 
understood to signify the limit which would open onto the future, and, 
moreover, ‘in the action itself’.53 One example of the functioning of the limit 
in the play would be the sentence passed on Antigone, that she is to be 
entombed alive. Not only is the sentence itself to place Antigone in the 
realm between life and death - she is to be placed in a chamber reserved 
for the dead while still alive, she is to be made to experience that which 
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would be the reserve of the already dead before she is dead - but, in 
addition, the passing of the sentence itself already situates her in a living 
relation to death such that her anticipation of certain death must be borne 
while she still lives. Hers is a ‘situation or fate of a life that is about to turn into 
certain death, a death lived by anticipation, a death that crosses over into the 
sphere of life, a life that moves into the realm of death’.54
What does make the character of Antigone stand out in the play is 
her beauty or, more precisely, her function as the beautiful, as that which 
would exceed the limits described in the play, the limits both of 
comprehension and of imagination. What makes the character of Antigone 
exceptional within the play is that she is presented as that which would be 
situated, impossibly, on the other side of the limit, in the realm of the Real. 
It is in this sense that Antigone comes to figure as or is raised to the status 
of das Ding. This is to say, in Lacan’s terms, that Antigone is presented as 
‘inhuman’.55 This is not, however, to situate her as something monstrous 
or abhorrent. When the chorus describes her as ώμός, a term Lacan 
translates as ‘something uncivilized, something raw’,56 it, the chorus, is still 
intent on recuperation. To describe her as ώμός would still be to situate 
her, to recuperate her to a certain comprehension, to insist on situating her 
in terms of the Symbolic. It is precisely insofar as Antigone cannot be 
situated, cannot be recuperated to a fixed idea that she functions for Lacan 
as the beautiful. It is important here to grasp that the notion of ‘beauty’ is 
not meant to refer to any convention, any delimited conception of (what 
would count as) physical or idealised beauty.57 Beauty cannot be captured 
in an image as such. Beauty, for Lacan, is rather a function and to speak, 
then, of Antigone’s beauty is to relate something of her function. That is to 
say, what is important in the character of Antigone is how she functions in 
relation to desire. Not, that is, how Antigone functions in relation to her 
desire but rather how Antigone, as beauty, functions in relation to the 
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desire of the one who watches her. In relation, that is, to the desire of the 
spectator.
Significant here, then, is the relation between beauty and desire, a 
relation which Lacan describes as ‘strange and ambiguous’.58
On the one hand, it seems that the horizon of desire may be
eliminated from the register of the beautiful. Yet, on the other hand, 
it has been no less apparent … that the beautiful has the effect, I 
would say, of suspending, lowering, disarming desire. The 
appearance of beauty intimidates and stops desire.
That is not to say that on certain occasions beauty cannot be joined 
to desire, but in a mysterious way, and in a form that I can do no 
better than refer to by the term that bears within it the structure of 
the crossing of some invisible line, i.e. outrage. Moreover, it seems 
that it is in the nature of the beautiful to remain, as they say, 
insensitive to outrage, and that is by no means one of the least 
significant elements of its structure.59
The function of the beautiful here is extrapolated in terms of the 
work of art and it is as a work of art that both Antigone, as dramatic art 
work, and Antigone, as an artistic creation within that art work, would be 
understood to function in relation to desire. This mysterious relation 
between beauty and desire cannot be reduced to the idea that beauty 
would, simply, be that at which desire would aim. Rather, in relation to 
the object which would be constituted as an object of beauty, desire is split 
such that it is this very splitting which would constitute the object as 
beautiful. That would be to say, the object might only be understood as 
beautiful as an effect of and on the desire which would manifest in 
relation to it. There is, here, no discernable and monolinear relation of 
cause and effect.
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In its status as limit point, the beautiful is that which would split 
desire, or in the terminology of later Lacan, that which would render the 
separation and, at the point of separation, the conjunction of desire and 
the drive. Desire is that which defines the subject in relation to lack. 
Desire, as such, cannot attain satisfaction. The drive, on the contrary, is 
that which maintains satisfaction through continuously circulating its 
object. The beautiful is that which would encompass both such points, 
thus, simultaneously reflecting the drive and allowing it to continue on its 
route and maintaining desire as unsatisfied. There is thus in the object of 
beauty both a moment of transfixion and a moment of satisfaction. If the 
object of beauty were capable of entirely satisfying desire it would be 
destructive of the subject but if it were incapable of providing satisfaction, 
it would lose its attraction. It is this conjunction of seemingly 
incommensurate characteristics which sets the beautiful apart. 
Desire is thus not ‘completely extinguished by the apprehension of 
beauty’60 but it is drawn on into that realm in which it could not subsist. 
It [beauty] seems to split desire as it continues on its way, for one 
cannot say that it is completely extinguished by the apprehension of 
beauty. It continues on its way, but now more than elsewhere, it 
has a sense of being taken in, and this is manifested by the splendor 
and magnificence of the zone that draws it on. On the other hand, 
since its excitement is not refracted but reflected, rejected, it knows 
it to be most real. But there is no longer any object.61
Desire has no object in the proper sense of the term. It is, in the 
terms of later Lacan, the drive which would take for itself, or which would 
be constituted in relation to, an object. The beautiful is unique in that it 
would allow for the conjunction of these two terms, or as Lacan has it in 
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the context of Seminar VII, for the splitting of desire into that which will 
retain an object and that for which ‘there is no longer any object’.62
It is as an example of the beautiful that Lacan reads Antigone and, 
particularly, within the play, Antigone. It is as such that, with Lacan, we 
find something in the text ‘other than a lesson on morality’.63 This is not to 
claim that Antigone has, for Lacan, no ethical import. It is, after all, in the 
context of his seminar on the ethics of psychoanalysis that he spends 
considerable time discussing the play. It is rather to stress that the ethical 
import of the play lies not in the moralising arguments it might be 
understood to put forward, whether these be in the sense of a discourse 
between competing conceptions of the just or (moral) good or in the sense 
of an advocation of a position of transgression. While both these positions 
are, of course, possible, neither addresses the question of ethics. They 
remain, rather, on the side of (questions of) the law. The ethical is by 
definition a subjective moment, the moment of subjective assumption in 
response to the lack encountered in the Other and the other. The ethical, 
that is, is the moment of assumption of that point which refuses 
recuperation to an image or to a rule, that point where the Symbolic and 
the Imaginary break down or break open upon the Real. In terms of the 
moral law, the ethical is the point at which the subject assumes upon itself 
the impossible place of that which would guarantee the law. In terms of 
the Imaginary, ethics is the response to that in the other which refuses 
recuperation to a coherent image of identification. To render Antigone or 
Antigone as an ethical example, or as the ethical example par excellence, is 
to assume to generalise that which is by definition beyond generalisation. 
That is to say, to confer upon Antigone the status of example would be to 
make of Antigone and her act a rule which might be followed; thou shalt 
transgress the symbolic. But such an example is clearly not an ethical 
example at all. The ethical moment would necessarily resist any such 
generalisation and return in the form of the necessity of the subject 
assuming upon itself the impetus to follow (or reject) the example. This is 
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clearly, also, not to set Antigone apart in this sense. It is not especially that 
Antigone or Antigone’s act cannot function as an ethical example. It is 
rather that the ethical cannot be exemplified without recuperating it to a 
law. Which is to say, precisely, without rendering it other than ethical.
What Antigone can function as is an example of the beautiful. But 
even here, it should be stressed that the example is not definitive. As 
Lacan stresses in a number of places, other examples can be found and the 
example should be one’s own; ‘[i]f you don’t find this example convincing, 
find others’.64  That is to say, Antigone functions as an example of the 
beautiful only insofar as she functions as the beautiful for the (particular) 
spectator. Insofar as she does function so, she and the play of which she is 
an element, can be understood to situate the spectator in relation to their 
desire and this is what is significant in terms of ethics.
As beautiful, as that which would simultaneously reflect and lure 
our desire, Antigone would demand a response. This demand would be 
the subject’s confrontation with the desire that is in it. That is to say, in its 
location at and as the limit point of the Real, that at which desire would 
impossibly aim, the beautiful can be understood to be that which would 
ask of the subject, ‘Have you acted in conformity with the desire that is in 
you?’65 As, that is, that which can simultaneously support and lure desire, 
that which allows the subject to confront das Ding without it destroying 
the subject, the beautiful would be that which would allow the subject to 
confront the desire that is in it and thus begin to name this desire, to bring 
it into the world. That is to say, it is precisely insofar as the beautiful 
allows the possibility of encountering the limit of the Real without 
subsuming the subject in the Real and thus rendering the subject 
impossible, that it allows the subject the possibility of both confronting its 
desire and inscribing its desire in the Symbolic.
It is in this sense that the beautiful would entail a cathartic function. 
The beautiful would allow the possibility of the purification of desire, not 
in the sense of allowing the subject to attain and occupy pure desire but in 
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the sense of allowing the subject to experience its desire stripped of the 
trappings of the Symbolic and Imaginary orders and, significantly, to 
return to the Symbolic and Imaginary orders, bringing with it ‘a new 
presence’,66 something which cannot simply be accommodated as though it 
had always already been there. The ethical significance of Antigone lies, 
therefore, not in Antigone’s act in the sense that her act would function as 
the quintessential ethical example but, rather, the ethical significance of 
the play lies in the manner in which it would relate to the desire of the 
spectator.  
The extent to which we can discuss Antigone’s act at all is the 
extent to which it has been or is being (re)inscribed in the Symbolic. This 
should alert us to the ambiguity of the act insofar as it can become a topic 
for discussion. Antigone’s act, in the proper Lacanian sense, is her act. It is 
only available for her. What impacts of Antigone’s act on others is 
either/both a moment of emergence of the Real and/or a Symbolic 
recuperation depending on the moment of logical time from which it is 
perceived. That is to say, we might discern separate moments in 
Antigone’s so called act. There would be the moment of incomprehension 
wherein the act disrupts and cannot be explained. There would also be the 
moment of comprehension wherein the act is slotted into a framework of 
explanation - e.g. Antigone promotes an alternative discourse on what is 
just, Antigone constitutes the revolutionary stance par excellence precisely 
because she promotes no discourse on justice at all but is understood to 
have introduced a moment of radical disruption for the social weave of 
Thebes. Neither of these perspectives, however, can be adequate to the act 
as it is assumed by Antigone, if it is in fact an act at all. Given that she is 
never more than a fictional character, one might be justified in pointing 
out that ‘she’ cannot assume anything. The pertinent ethical question in 
Antigone is how we, the audience, the spectator, the reader, respond to the 
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play and respond beyond the play. The only true act in Antigone is 
precisely not in Antigone, it is in response to Antigone.
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